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45 Cal.Rptr. 129
Magdalena KASTNER. Plalnllff
and Respondent,

v.
LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY el al.. Oelendants and Appellants.
L. A. 28382.

Supreme COUlt of California,
In Bank.
June 28, 1965.

Action against transit authority and bus
driver for wrongful death of pedestrian who
was struck by bus. The Superior Coltrt, Los
Angeles County, Laurence J. Rittenband, J.,
entered a judgment ill favor of the plaintiff
and the transit company and bus driver appealed. "!"he Supreme Court, McComb, J"
held that evidence was sufficient to sustain

finding of negligence of bus driver who
struck pedestrian,- who was standing, according to some testimony, in crosswalk at
intersection when struck by bus which was
turning left at intersection during a hard
rain at night and testimony of traffic officer
as to point of impact was admissible even
though opinion ,vas based in part on driver's
statement to officer.
Affirmed.

I. Automobiles e:::>244(6)

Evidence sustained finding of negti{{cnce on part of transit authority and bus
dri"er who 'vas operating. bus during -hard
rain at night and fatally injured pedestrian
who was struck while standing~ according
to some testimony, in crosswalk as bus drivcr was making a left turn at intersection.
~548, 552
In proper case, expert can give his opinion whether he bases such opinion on -facts
prcsented in hypothetical question or on
facts he observed for himself, and key
question is whether or not subject is one
permitting expert testimony, not sourCe of
facts on which opinion is predicated.

2. Evidence

403 P.2d-25

3. Eyldence ~S07, 508
Expert testimony is admissible or not
dependent upon whether subject matter is
within common experience or whether it is
a special field where opinion of one of skill
and experience would be of greater validity
than that of ordinary juryman.
4. Eyldence

~519

In field of automobile accidents much
must be Ie ft to common sense and discretion
of trial court with respect to whether traffic
officer, an expert in investigating accidents,
should be allowed to express an expert opinion as to point of impact.
5. Evidence 0$=>550(1), 552

Expert may, in any case proper for reception of expert testimony, give his opinion although he did not personally observe
facts, and bases his opinion on facts testified
to by' other witnesses and included in hypothetical questions put to him.
6. Eyldence

~508

If case is one for expert testimony, this
is so not because expert has witnessed the
facts, but because he is qualified by reason
of his special knowledge to form an opinion
on facts while ordinary juror is not.
7. Evidence ¢::::IS19, 555

'\There point at which bus struck pedestrian was not so obvious that any person,
trained or not, could infer from evidence
where it was located, court properly admitted expert testimony of traffic officer who
based his conclusions in part on statement
given by bus driver to officer.
8. Evidence 0$=>555

Opinion evidence based on hearsay is
admissible.
9. Evidence 0$=>550(1)

Traffic officer's opinion testimony as to
point of impact, although based to large
extent on defendant driver's statement to
officer, was not based on hearsay where driver testified to the identical facts which were
included in his statement.
10. Trial <$=>235(7)

Trial court properly instructed jurors
that they were to give traffic officer's opinion
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as to point of impact between bus and pedes.
trian only the weight to which they deemed
it entitled and that they could reject it if
in their judgment the reasons given for it
were unsound.
II. Automobiles *'>246(60)
Court did not err in instructing jury
that law presumed that pedestrian fatalJy
struck by bus had been exercising ordinary

care in manner in which he was crossing
intersection at time of accident, that he was
crossing intersection within marked pedes.
trian crosswalk and that if a conflict in
evidence existed it was the jury's duty to
weigh presumption and any evidence which
may support it against contrary evidence.
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 1%3, subds. I,
33.

David H. Olson, Harry M. Hunt and Victor Rosenblatt, Los Angeles, for defendants
and appellants.
Gibson, Dunn &: Crutcher and G. Edward
Fitzgerald, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and
respondent.

McCOMB, Justice.
Defendants appeal from a judgment' in
favor of plaintiff, after trial before a jury,
in an action to recover damages for wrongful death.
Facts: Plaintiff is the widow of Paul
Kastner, who died as the result of injuries
sustained in a bus-pedestrian accident on
January 5, 1959, at approximately 10 p. m.,
at the intersection of Crenshaw Boulevard
and Florence Avenue in the City of Los
Angeles.
At the time of the accident, defendant
Neal was operating the bus as an employee
of defendant Los Angeles Metropolitan
Transit Authority and was acting within the
course and scope of his employment.
Questions: First. Was there substantial
evidence to sustain the verdict!
Yes. Defendant Neal testified, as follows:
Immediately before the accident, he was
proceeding in a southerly direction on Cren-

shaw Boulevard in the lane next to the
center of the street When he was about
50 to 75 feet north of the crosswalk at the
intersection of Crenshaw Boulevard and
Florence Avenue, the signal turned to green
for traffic on Crenshaw.
At that time, he saw two northbound cars.
After they had passed him, he made a left
turn onto Florence Avenue, accelerating
from a speed of about two or three miles an
hour at the point at which he made his turn
to about five miles an hour at the crosswalk.
It was raining very hard. There were
windshield wipers on the front windows,
and he could see for a distance of hal f a
block in front of the bus. If he looked directly out the side windows, he could see
across the street. The windows on the
sides were livery heavy [sic] covered with
rain, probably some mud and filrn."
The vehicle was approximately 35 feet
long j and when he turned and went through
the easterly crosswalk, the right front of
the vehicle was in the curb lane on Florence
Avenue and the left rear in the second lane.
He did not hear any sound of an unusual
nature until his vehicle was uapproxirnateIy
straightened out going towards the curb at
approxirnately 45-degree angle." At that
time, the speed of the vehicle was approxirnately 12 miles an hour, and the front end
of the bus was approximately 30 feet past
the east line of the crosswalk.
What he heard "sounded like something
had been blown or thrown or knocked into
the side" of the bus "about the middle between the front and the rear." He did not
know whether the contact was on the right
or the left side. The vehicle proceeded
about 50 feet further before he brought it
to a stop.

He alighted and walked back to a point
near the middle of the bus. He then saw
in the street an object which he determined
to be a man's body. The body was "approxi_
mately between 15 and 18-20 fe~t" east of
the east line of the crosswalk and Ifapproxi_
mately 12 or 14 feet" north of the curb line
on Florence Avenue. He later walked
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around the bus twice, but observed no un..
usual marks on the road film on the bus. He
did not, however J use a flashlight in making
his observations.
Defendant Neal admitted that at the
coroner's inquest he had testified that at the
time he heard the thud the front of the bus
was past the crosswalk but he could not
say for sure whether the center of the bus
was.
Harry Waggoner, a service station operator at the southeast corner of Florence and
Crenshaw, testified that he saw the bus just
before the accident as it was approaching the
intersection; that he observed it until it
was in approximately th~ center of the intersection; that the telephone at the service
station rang, and he ran inside to answer
it; that he subsequently observed the bus
after it had made the turn j that he saw a
reflection of something falling on the left
side of the bus about three feet back of
where the driver would sit; that he then saw
the left rear of the bus rise up and an object come shooting out as if it had been
pushed with a great force approximately 10
feet to the rear of the bus; and that he ran
out to the street and Saw the body of a man
lying seven feet from the south curb of
Florence Avenue and 20 feet east of the
crosswalk.
Stuart Baxter, a police officer, testified as
to his training and experience in the investigation of traffic accidents, in order to qualify
as an expert witness j and he was allowed to
give his opinion as to the point of impact.
He placed such point in the easterly half of
the crosswalk approximately 15 feet north
()f the south Cl1rb of Florence Avenue.
Officer Baxter testified that he based his
opinion on the following factors: "The
travel of the bus in its direction of travel and
path, crossing the crosswalk, the statement
• Defendant Neal's statement was, as follows: ''I was traveling south on Crenshaw in the center lane of traffic and was
making a left-hand tum into Florence
Avenue when I heard a thud to the rear
of my bUB. When I heard this thud I
stopped the bus as quickly as I could
and upon looking behind the bus I saw
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of the driver, and the marks on the side of
the bus [disturbances in the road film], the
path of the bus as described by the driver,
and his observations of a thud that he had
heard while he was turning."
Officer Baxter testified that the disturbances in the road film on the front and side
of the bus appeared to be recent and to have
been caused at approximately the time of
the accident, that they were on the righthaod corner of the bus and extended to
about the right front wheel, and that in his
opinion they were uconnected with the
pedestrian and the bus." He admitted, however, that at the. coroner's inquest he had
testified that he was unable to determine if
the marks had been left by the pedestrian.
Although there were large clots of blood
at the point where the body came to rest,
there was no physical evidence in the street
to indicate the point of impact.
[1.1 Whether defendant Neal, in the circumstances related, exercised ordinary care
in looking for pedestrians Or was negligent
in failing to see the deceased was purely a
question of fact for the jury. (Foti v. Morrissey, 57 Ca1.App.2d 328, 331 [1], 134 P.2d
51 [hearing denied by the Supreme Court];
cf. McNear v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 63
Ca1.App.2d II, 14 [1], 146 P.2d 34 [hearing denied by the Supreme Court].)
The evidence hereinabove set forth was
sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury
that defendants were guilty of negligence.
Second. Did the court err in admitting

Ih. opinion I,stimony of Officer Baxter as
10 Ih, point of impacl'
. No. Defendants contend that it was not
proper to allow Officer Baxter to give an
opinion .on the point of impact, since he
based his opinion almost entirely on a statement given to him by defendant Neal.'
the pedestrian lying in the roadway. I
made a normal left-hand turn and did not
cut the button when leaving Crenshaw or
entering Florence.
"I was turning slow and was almost
completely turned when I heard the thud.
I had nearly completed my turn and was
just starting to right the steering

----------------------,--------------------------------------388
[2]
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In a proper case, an expert can give

. his opinion, whether he bases such opinion
on facts presented in a hypothetical ques·
ticn or upon facts he observed for himself.
The key question is whether or not the sub·

ject under discussion is one permitting expert testimony, not the source of the facts
upon which the opinion is predicated.

[3]

Thus, expert testimony is admis-

to him. If the case is one for expert testimony, this is so not because the expert has
witnessed the facts, but because he is quali~
fled by reason of his special knowledge to
form an opinion on the facts while the Qrdinary juror is not. (Manney v. Housing
Authority of City of Richmond, 79 Cal.App.
2d 453, 459-460 [3], 180 P.2d 69 [hearing
denied by the Supreme Court].)

sible or not dependent upon whether the
subj ect matter is within common experience
or whether it is a special field where the
opinion of one of skill and experience will
be of greater validity than that of the
ordinary juryman. It is quite obvious that
the conclusion, based upon the facts of the
particular case, as to just where a collision
bet\vcen two vehicles occurred, may be so
obvious that any reasonable person, trained
or not, can draw that inference from the
facts.

[7] In the present case, the point of impact v..'as not so obvious that any person,
trained or not, could infer from. the evi~
dence where it was located. Accordingly,
the case was one where the opinion of a
trained expert in the field could be of as~
sistance to the members of the jury in arriving' at their conclusions, and the trial
court properly received opinion evidence by
a person found to be qualified to testify as
an expert.

[4] It is equally clear that cases may oc~
cur where the opinions of trained experts
in the field on this subject will be of great
assistance to the members of the jury in ar~
riving at their conclusions. In such cases,
a traffic officer who has spent years investi~
gating accidents in which he has been re~
qui red to render official reports not only as
to the facts of the accidents but also as to
his opinion of their causes, including his
opinion, where necessary, as to the point of
impact, is an expert. Necessarily, in this
field much must be left to the common sense
and discretion of the trial court. (Zelayeta
v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 104 Ca1.App.2d
716, 724-727 [4--6], 232 P.2d 572.)

[8> 9] Opinion evidence based on hca.r~
say is inadmissible. (See Jones on Evi~
dence (5th ed. 1958) § 421, p. 794.) Officer
Baxter's opinion, however, although based
to a large extent upon defendant Neal's
statement made outside the courtroom, was
not based upon hearsay evidence, because
defendant Neal testified on the witness
stand to the identical facts which were in~
eluded in his statement. (See George v.
Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834,
&14,205 P.2d 1037.)

[5,6] The expert in any case proper for
the reception of expert testimony may give
his opinion although he did not personally
observe the facts, basing his opinion upon
the facts testified to by other witnesses
and included in hypothetical questions put
wheel to stl'night<'n' it ont when I h<'nrd
the thurl. I did not see ony pedestrians
in the crosswalk when I started turning
or while I was turnillg. I did not observe any pedestrinns stunding on the
southeast corner of the intersection when
I started turning or while I was turning.
I did not see any pedestrians in the roadway before I heard the thuu.

[10] Although under the above rules
Officer Baxter's opinion was properly received in evidence, how much weight it was
entitled to receive is another matter. The
trial court, however, properly instructed the
jurors that they were to give it only the
weight to which they deemed it entitled, and
that they could reject it if in their judgment
the reasons given for it were unsound.
(See \Vells TT\lCkways, Ltd. v. Cebrian,
"Xo one identified themselves to me as
n witness. I was wearing my glasses
when I was driving. My bus was empty
when the traffic accident happened and I
was not intending to pick up at the bus
stop east of Crenshaw."

DiltE HALL
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122 Ca1.App.2d 666, 677--fJ78 [9-10], 265
P.2d 557.)
The following cases, relied on by defendants, are factually distinguishable:
In Stuart v. Dotts, 89 CaJ.App.2d 683, 201
P.2d 820, the police officer based his opinion
on the defendant's statement, which was a
self-serving declaration and inadmissible

under the hearsay evidence rule.

In addi-

tion, the officer had not been qualified as an
expert.

In Ribble v. Cook, 111 Ca1.App.2d 903,
245 P.2d 593, th~ police officer's opinion
was ruled to lack proper foundation, because it was based on the ,self-serving declaration of the defendant and the statement
of a' witness who did not see the impact,
which evidence was clearly hearsay. The

any e'tJidence which may support it, agains'
the contrary evidence, and to determine
which, if either"preponderates. Such deliberations, of course, shall be related to and
be in accord with my instructions on the
burden of proof."
No. The instruction is based on section
1963, subdivisions 1 and 33, of the Code of
Civil Procedure and is in accord with two
decisions o£ this court. (Westberg v.
Willde, 14 Cal.2d 360, 364-365 [1],94 P.2d
590; Olsen v. Standard Oil Co., 188 Cal.
20,24-25 [5], 204 P. 393.)
The judgment is affirmed.

PETERS, TOBRINER, PEEK, MOSK,
and BURKE, JJ., concur.

TRAYNOR, Chief Justice (concurring).
officer's testimony was adjudged almost
I concur in the judgment for the reasons
worthless. because it depended on the credstated in my concurring opinion in Brown
ibility of persons other than himself.
v. Connolly, 62 A.C. 405, 412, 42 Cal.Rptr.
In Kalfus v. Fraze, 136 CaJ.App.2d 415, 324, 398 P.2d 596.
288 P.2d 967, the police officer based his .
opinion on conversations with the defendant and another witness at the scene of the
o K"""'"""'7.""'"o::"7.,,,,,accident Evidence of the defendant's self,
serving declaration and the witness' statement were both inadmissible under the
hearsay evidence rule.
45 CaJ.Rptr. 133
In Hodges v. Severns, 201 CaJ.App.2d 99, In re Monroe Smith HALL on Habeas Corpus.

i

20 Ca1.Rptr.

129~

the police officer who tes-

. tificd was not qualified as an expert witness.

Cr. 8880•

Supr('lUC Court of California,

[11] Third. DUJ the court err in g;'.•
ing the foUowing instruction? uThe law
presumes that Paul Kastner, now deceased,
'Was exercising ordinal,)' care and was obeyiug the law in the manner in which lie
crossed the intersection in question, and
presumes that lie was crossing such intersection wit hi,.. the marked pedestrian crosswalk pro,·ided therefor. Each will .tlpport
a finding in: accord '<.t'ith the presumption
where there is no proof to the contra.ry, and
each wiil support Sftch a finding in the face
of contraJ'Y evidence, if )'our judgment so
directs after weighing the conflicting evidence.
l'W/icn such a conflict exists, it is the
jur:/s duty to weigh the presumption, and

In Bank.
.June 30, 1905.

Habeas corpus proceeding filed on
ground that state prison inmate was being
illegally detained. The Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, David W. Williams, J.,
dismissed petition, and petition was filtd in
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court,
McComb, J., held that Adult Authority
lacked power to add to former parolee's
term a fugitive time of 19 months representing time spent in jail pending and during trial of murder prosecution, where former parolee was acquitted of murder
charge, and other ground for parole sus-

